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Executive summary 
The National Intelligence Council's (NIC) 2025 Global Trends report deals with how key 
global trends might develop over the next 15 years to influence world events. It contains a 
range of possibilities and potential discontinuities, amongst others in the form of four global 
scenarios and 2025 Global Landscape 'certainties' and 'uncertainties'. An overview of the 
report is provided with content highlights, extracts from the 2025 Global Landscape and 
selected commentary about sub-Saharan Africa. 
Introduction 
In November 2008 the National Intelligence Council (NIC) released its 4th unclassified Global 
Trends report, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World1), which takes a long-term view of the 
future. The NIC is the US Intelligence Community's2) centre for mid and long-term strategic 
thinking. Its mission statement proclaims that NIC members should provide government leaders 
with the 'best, unvarnished, and unbiased information' they can. The NIC is also tasked with 
'reaching out to nongovernment experts in academia and the private sector to broaden the 
Intelligence Community's perspective' and also 'engages with outside experts to tap their know-
ledge and insights'. Newly elected President Obama has been briefed on the report, and it thus 
has potential significance in aligning viewpoints on key themes of future US foreign policy and 
strategy. For these reasons the Global Trends series are valuable tools for future planning.  
The 2008 report looks at how key global trends might develop over the next 15 years to influence 
world events. The NIC emphasises that the report is not an exercise in prediction and that they are 
cognisant of many possible futures. Hence, they offer a range of possibilities and potential 
discontinuities, amongst others in the form of four global scenarios and 2025 Global Landscape 
'certainties' and 'uncertainties'. This Strategy Insights provides an overview of the report; focussing 
on its main themes, extracts from the 2025 Global Landscape and selected commentary dealing 
with sub-Saharan Africa. 
Main themes 
Global Trends 2025 contains seven chapters dealing with the following themes: 
1. The Globalising Economy (growing middle class, global imbalances, multiple financial nodes, 
diverging development models). 
2. The Demographics of Discord (population growth, decline and diversification, as well as youth 
bulges, pensioner booms, migration, urbanisation). 
3. The New Players (China, India, other key players and up-and-coming powers). 
4. Scarcity in the Midst of Plenty (the geopolitics of energy, dawning of a post-petroleum age, 
water and food security and climate change). 
5. Growing Potential for Conflict ('arc of instability', growing risk of nuclear arms race in the 
Middle East, new conflicts over resources). 
                                           
1)
 A complete copy of the report can be downloaded from the NIC website: http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html. 
2)
 The US Intelligence Community consists of various organisations, some more well-known than others, e.g. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defence 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), etc. 
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6. Will the International System Be Up to the Challenges? (multi-polarity, multilateralism, a 
world of networks). 
7. Power-sharing in a Multi-polar World (US leadership role, new relationships and old partner-
ships, less financial margin of error, limited military superiority). 
Some of the primary considerations in the report are that 
 the whole international system, as constructed after WWII, will be revolutionised. Not only will 
new players – Brazil, Russia, India and China – have a seat at the international high table; but 
they will bring new stakes and rules of the game; 
 the unprecedented transfer of wealth, roughly from West to East, now under way will continue 
for the foreseeable future; 
 unprecedented economic growth, coupled with 1.5b more people, will put pressure on 
resources, particularly energy, food and water, raising the spectre of scarcities emerging as 
demand outstrips supply; and 
 the potential for conflict will increase owing, partly, to political turbulence in parts of the 
greater Middle East. 
When comparing Global Trends 2025 with its predecessor, Mapping the Global Future: Report of 
the Intelligence Council's 2020 Project which was published in 2003, it is interesting to note the 
following differences and similarities: 
2020 Project (published in 2003) Global Trends 2025 (published in 2008) 
 Projected probable strong global economic growth 
fuelled by the rise of Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
 Projects probable strong global economic growth, 
but assesses the likelihood of major discontinuities 
as high. 
 Projected continued US dominance and surmised 
that major powers had relinquished attempts at 
balancing US dominance. 
 Assumes a multi-polar future and therefore dra-
matic changes in the international system. The US 
plays a prominent role in global events, but is one 
among many global actors who manage problems. 
 Energy supplies 'in the ground' considered suf-
ficient to meet global demand. Uncertainties about 
political instability in producer countries that might 
negatively affect international oil markets. Mentioned 
global increase in energy consumption, but em-
phasised continued domination of fossil fuels. 
 Views the world as in the midst of a transition to 
cleaner fuels. New technologies seen to have the 
capability for fossil fuel substitutes and solutions to 
water and food scarcity.  
 Acknowledged that energy demands will influence 
superpower relations. 
 Considers energy scarcity as a driving factor in 
geopolitics. 
 
The 2025 Global Landscape (NIC, 2008:iv-v) 
The Global Landscape section consists of two tables (replicated below) with the first juxtaposing 
relative certainties and their likely impacts, whereas the second contains key uncertainties and 
their corresponding potential consequences. 
 The unprecedented shift in relative wealth and 
economic power roughly from West to East now 
under way will continue. 
 As some countries become more invested in their 
economic well-being, incentives toward geopolitical 
stability could increase. But, the transfer is streng-
thening states like Russia that want to challenge the 
Western order. 
 The US will remain the single most powerful 
country but will be less dominant. 
 Shrinking economic and military capabilities could 
force the US into a difficult set of tradeoffs between 
domestic versus foreign policy priorities. 
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 Continued economic growth, coupled with 1.2b 
more people by 2025, will put pressure on energy, 
food, and water resources. 
 The pace of technological innovation will be key 
to outcomes during this period. All current tech-
nologies are inadequate for replacing traditional 
energy architecture on the scale needed. 
 
 The number of countries with youthful populations 
in the 'arc of instability'3) will decrease, but the 
populations of several youth-bulge states are pro-
jected to remain on rapid growth trajectories. 
 Unless employment conditions change drama-
tically in parlous youth-bulge states - Afghanistan, 
Nigeria, Pakistan and Yemen - these countries will 
remain prone to continued instability and state 
failure. 
 The potential for conflict will increase owing to 
rapid changes in parts of the greater Middle East and 
the spread of lethal capabilities. 
 The need for the US to act as regional balancer in 
the Middle East will increase, although other outside 
powers, Russia, China & India, will play greater roles 
than currently. 
 Terrorism is unlikely to disappear by 2025, but its 
appeal could lessen if economic growth continues in 
the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. 
For those terrorists that are active the diffusion of 
technologies will put dangerous capabilities within 
their reach. 
 Opportunities for mass-casualty terrorist attacks 
using chemical, biological, or less likely, nuclear 
weapons will increase as technology diffuses and 
nuclear power (and possibly weapons) programmes 
expand. The practical and psychological consequen-
ces of such attacks will intensify in an increasingly 
globalised world. 
 
Key uncertainties Potential consequences 
 Whether an energy transition away from oil and 
gas, supported by improved energy storage, biofuels 
and clean coal is completed during the 2025 time 
frame 
 With high oil and gas prices, major exporters, 
eg, Russia and Iran, will substantially augment 
their levels of national power, with Russia's GDP 
potentially approaching that of the UK and France. 
A sustained plunge in prices, perhaps underpinned 
by a fundamental switch to new energy sources, 
could trigger a long-term decline for producers as 
global and regional players. 
 How quickly climate change occurs and the 
locations where its impact is most pronounced. 
 Climate change is likely to exacerbate resource 
scarcities, particularly water scarcities. 
 Whether mercantilism stages a comeback and 
global markets recede.  
 Descending into a world of resource nationalism 
increases the risk of great power confrontations. 
 Whether advances toward democracy occur in 
China and Russia. 
 Political pluralism seems less likely in Russia in 
the absence of economic diversification. A growing 
middle class increases the chances of political 
liberalisation and potentially greater nationalism in 
China. 
 Whether the greater Middle East becomes more 
stable, especially whether Iraq stabilises, and 
whether the Arab-Israeli conflict is resolved 
peacefully. 
 Turbulence is likely to increase under most 
scenarios. Revival of economic growth, a more 
prosperous Iraq, and an Israeli- Palestinian 
resolution could engender some stability as the 
region deals with a stronger Iran and a global 
transition away from oil and gas. 
 Whether Europe and Japan overcome economic 
and social challenges caused or compounded by 
demography. 
 Successful integration of Muslim minorities in 
Europe could enlarge the productive work forces 
and avert social crises. Lack of efforts by Europe 
and Japan to mitigate demographic challenges 
could lead to long-term declines. 
 Whether global powers work with multilateral 
institutions to adapt their structure and performance 
to the transformed geopolitical landscape. 
 Emerging powers show ambivalence toward 
global institutions, e.g., the UN and IMF, but this 
could change as they become bigger players on 
the global stage. Traditional alliances will weaken. 
 
                                           
3) Countries with youthful age structures and rapidly growing populations mark a crescent or 'arc of instability' stretching from the Andean region of 
Latin America across Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus, and through the northern parts of South Asia. 
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Scenarios 
The four scenarios in Global Trends 2025 address the future of globalisation, the future structure of 
the international system and highlight the new challenges that could emerge as a result of the 
ongoing global transformation. As a set they do not cover all possible futures, but describe four 
possible alternative futures that could result from the trends discussed in the report.  
In constructing the scenarios, the NIC authors focused on critical uncertainties regarding the 
relative importance of the nation-state as opposed to non-state actors. In some of the scenarios, 
states are more dominant and drive global dynamics; in others, non-state actors, including 
religious movements, nongovernmental organisations, and super-empowered individuals play 
more important roles. In some of the scenarios, key players interact in competing groups, 
through partnerships and cross-border affiliations. Other scenarios envision more interaction as 
autonomous players operate independently and sometimes come into conflict with one another. 
The report's summarised scenarios (NIC, 2008:4) follow below: 
 A World Without the West. This world, described in a fictitious letter from a future head of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), sees new powers supplanting the West as world 
leaders. An overburdened US withdraws from Central Asia, including Afghanistan; Europe does 
not step up to take the lead. Russia, China, and others are forced to deal with the potential 
spill-over and instability in Central Asia. The SCO gains ascendance while NATO's status 
declines. Anti-China antagonism in the US and Europe reaches a high; protectionist trade 
barriers are put into place. Russia and China enter a marriage of convenience; other countries, 
eg, India and Iran, rally around them. The lack of any stable bloc, in the Western or non-
Western world, adds to growing instability and disorder, potentially threatening globalisation. 
 October Surprise. This world, depicted in a diary entry of a future US president, shows many 
countries have been preoccupied with achieving economic growth at the expense of safe-
guarding the environment. The scientific community has not been able to issue specific 
warnings, but worries increase that a tipping point has been reached in which climate change 
has accelerated with very destructive possible impacts. New York City is hit by a major 
hurricane linked to global climate change; the NY Stock Exchange is severely damaged and, 
faced with such destruction, world leaders must start thinking about taking drastic measures, 
such as relocating parts of coastal cities. 
 BRICs' Bust-up. In this world, conflict breaks out between China and India over access to 
vital resources. Outside powers intervene before the conflict escalates and expands into a 
global conflagration. The clash is triggered by Chinese suspicion of efforts by others to 
threaten Beijing's energy supplies. Misperceptions and miscalculations lead to the clash. The 
scenario highlights the importance of energy and other resources to continued growth and 
development as a great power. It shows the extent to which conflict in a multi-polar world is 
just as likely to occur between rising states as between older and newer powers. 
 Politics is Not Always Local. In this world, outlined in an article by a fictitious Financial 
Times reporter, various non-state networks – NGOs, religious groups, business leaders, and 
local activists – combine to set the international agenda on the environment and use their 
clout to elect the UN Secretary General. The global political coalition of non-state actors plays 
a crucial role in securing a new world-wide climate change agreement. In this connected world 
of digital communications, growing middle classes, and transnational interest groups, politics is 
no longer local and domestic and international agendas become increasingly interchangeable. 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
According to Global Trends 2025, sub-Saharan Africa will remain the region most vulnerable to 
economic disruption, population stresses, civil conflict and political instability. Despite increased 
global demand for commodities supplied by sub-Saharan Africa, local populations are unlikely to 
experience significant economic gain. Windfalls from sustained increases in commodity prices 
might entrench corrupt or otherwise ill-equipped governments in some regions, diminishing 
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prospects for democratic and market-based reforms. 'Poor economic policies – rooted in 
patrimonial interests and incomplete economic reform – will likely exacerbate ethnic and religious 
divides as well as crime and corruption in many countries. Ruling elites are likely to continue to 
accrue greater income and wealth, while poverty will persist or worsen in rural areas and sprawl-
ing urban centres. The divide between elite and non-elite populations is likely to widen, reinforce-
ing conditions that could generate divisive political and religious extremism' (NIC, 2008: 56). 
Sub-Saharan Africa will also be adversely affected by climate change which is expected to 
exacerbate resource scarcities. Although the impact of climate change will vary by region, a 
number of regions will begin to suffer harmful effects, particularly water scarcity and loss of 
agricultural production. Regional differences in agricultural production are likely to become more 
pronounced over time with declines disproportionately concentrated in developing countries, 
particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Conclusion 
The report has not been positioned in any way as predictive, and as noted in the foreword by the 
NIC Chairman Thomas Fingar, little of what is in the report is 'inevitable or immutable', and any 
notion of determinism should be avoided. He states: 
'If you like where events seem to be headed, you may want to take timely action to 
preserve their positive trajectory. If you do not like where they appear to be going, you 
will have to develop and implement policies to change their trajectory.'  
The future is, to a considerable extent, in our own hands. 
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